Philosophy
Ken-Terika Zellner

Male Sex Right & the Fraternal Social Contract

An Analysis of Political Membership in Locke’s Second Treatise of Government

  • Faculty Advisor

    Charles Mills

Published On

May 2017

Originally Published

NURJ 2016-17
Honors Thesis

ABSTRACT

Virtually every country in the world ascribes citizenship at birth, yet John Locke maintains that individuals join commonwealths—and leave the state of nature—by expressly consenting to them. To interrogate this tension, I use Carol Pateman’s notion of the “fraternal social contract,” which subjugates women’s bodies to individual men. I argue that birth-based citizenship is a corollary to the fraternal social contract which gives the (male) state access to women’s reproductive power, thereby turning every woman into a citizen (re)producer for the state. Furthermore, I show how Locke’s notion of “tacit consent” functions as an exclusionary mechanism, dividing the citizenry into white male “perfect members” who receive the full rights of democratic citizenship, and white women, nonwhites, and children are “associate members” who are obliged to follow the laws but are prevented from fully participating in democracy.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is about patriarchy, politics, and women’s bodies. In this paper, I demonstrate that birth-based citizenship is a corollary to the sexual contract that grants a “civil fraternity” of men access to women’s reproductive capacities. First, I use Carol Pateman’s notion of the fraternal social contract to argue that Locke’s insistence that birth is not, in fact, the mechanism by which governments “make” their citizens. Rather, it is a patriarchal attempt to render women and women’s bodies politically irrelevant. Next, I interrogate Locke’s distinction between express and tacit consent. I propose two categories of membership to reconcile Locke’s statements with the “real world,” while arguing that consent and the ability to consent has the power to exclude unprivileged groups from the polity.

JOHN LOCKE, BIRTH-BASED CITIZENSHIP, AND THE FRATERNAL SOCIAL CONTRACT

Because the aim of this project is to interrogate Lockean political membership mechanisms by situating consent alongside the practice of assuming citizenship from birth, it is necessary to consider who gives birth as we consider the political significance of membership via birth. The fact that women give birth is an empirical claim in only the loosest sense. However, this fact will form the basis of the foregoing analysis of the state as biologically reproduced. Because birth is a universal criterion for state membership, I argue that a key corollary to what Pateman calls the “fraternal social contract,” which gives men qua men access to women’s bodies, is that the state simultaneously gains access to women’s bodies through birth-based citizenship practices. I show that Locke, committed to keeping women outside of his political ontology, explicitly excludes birth as a criterion for political membership.

“If the state is to continue, it must have citizens,” writes Buker, and it is women who produce those citizens. Yuval-Davis contends that women biologically produce citizen bodies and culturally reproduce the collective identities which reproduce the nation-state generation after generation.[14] “By dressing and behaving ‘properly’, and by giving birth to children within legitimate marriages, [women] both signify and reproduce the symbolic and legal boundaries of the collectivity.”[1] Indeed, McIntosh’s Marxist-feminist contention, that the “household system” is necessary for capitalist modes of production “for the reproduction of the working class” is instructive (255). For the existence of the state as a political entity analogously requires a birth-based citizenship system for the reproduction of the citizenry through women’s bodies.

14. Yuval-Davis, Nira. Gender & Nation. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1997.

1. Anthias, Floya and Nira Yuval-Davis. Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-racist Struggle. New York: Routledge, 1992.

Birth-based citizenship is a key component of the fraternal social contract. As Pateman explains, “Modern patriarchy is fraternal in form and the original contract is a fraternal pact.”[10] Under traditional patriarchal theory, such as Robert Filmer’s, both political right and sex right are located in the figure of the father. In other words, men qua fathers exercise political rule and have sexual access to women’s bodies. However, under the fraternal social contract, it is the “male principle” which unites all men qua men under a common bond, thereby forming a fraternity.[10] This band of brothers separates political right from sex right, relegating political right to the polis—where women are not allowed—and sex right to the now apolitical family—women’s proper domain. The new “fatherless” patriarchy preserves women’s subjection, but frees men from the rule of the father-patriarch-king so that all men by virtue of their maleness—instead of their status of fathers—can share in the father’s former power in two separate spheres: the public polis and the private family.

The fraternal social contract marks the advent of a new being: the citizen. The brothers who banded together to defeat the patriarchal father now exist in relation to each other as citizens, members of the new polis. The status of citizen is one based on consent. To increase the number of citizens in a political society, more (male) individuals would have to consent to become members. Intuitively, then, one might imagine a citizenship-granting procedure that is open to all adult (male) individuals involving a series of oaths to observe the laws, pay taxes, etc. However, this is not what happens. Sure, there are immigration procedures which allow people to become citizens of nations of which they are not already members, but people are citizens somewhere before they migrate, i.e., take an oath to become a lawful member of a state. Furthermore, most people never immigrate, yet everyone is a citizen. How does this happen? Citizenship is assumed from birth. Whether because of who a child’s parents are (jus sanguinis) or because of where a child is born (jus soli), the status of citizen is conferred onto the child the moment he is born.

10. Pateman, Carol. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.

These forms of birth-based citizenship are exercises of male sex right. Discussions of male sex right most often bring to mind images of marriage. To return to McIntosh, it is easy to see how heterosexual marriage grants men access to women’s bodies because of their respective statuses as men and women. Indeed, speaking of state custody laws, Jacqueline Stevens writes, “The state itself, by controlling reproduction, appropriates the reproduction for which mothers are otherwise responsible.”[12] However, this same paradigm applies to birth-based citizenship practices. The fraternal social contract separates political right and sex right. Sex right, in one of its guises, is exercised by the husband-father over the wife-mother. Political right is dispersed throughout the civil fraternity that is formed by the social contract; civil fraternity is also a site of male sex right. By legally declaring that every child born in a certain place or every child born to certain parents is a citizen, i.e., a member of the political society formed by the fraternal social contract, the civil fraternity asserts authority over women’s bodies by appropriating their reproductive powers for the purposes of maintaining and continuing political society. Male sex right as exercised by the civil fraternity—as opposed to individual husbands over their wives—legally designates all women of a certain “blood” or all women within the borders of a certain territory citizen producers.

12. Stevens, Jacqueline. Reproducing the State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

5. Eisenstein, Zillah. The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986.

As Eisenstein powerfully states,

Patriarchy, as a system of oppression, recognizes the potential power of women and the actual power of men. Its purpose is to destroy woman’s consciousness about her potential power, which derives from the necessity of society to reproduce itself. By trying to affect woman’s consciousness and her life options, patriarchy protects the appropriation of women’s sexuality, their reproductive capacities, and their labor by individual men and society as a whole.[5]

The state recognizes the power of women’s reproductive capacities as essential for the continued existence of the state, and birth-based citizenship practices allow the state to appropriate those reproductive capacities. Paradoxically, however, women’s reproduction is relegated to the apolitical private sphere of the family.[1] By simultaneously assuming citizenship from birth and situating the decision whether or not to have children as a private family matter, the state co-opts women’s biological capacities while obscuring the state-sustaining power of women’s bodies.[2] Keeping women ignorant of their power in this way is key to women’s subordination, which is “to men as men, or to men as a fraternity.” Birth-based citizenship is one of many manifestations of fatherless fraternal patriarchy.[10]

1. Anthias, Floya and Nira Yuval-Davis. Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and Class and the Anti-racist Struggle. New York: Routledge, 1992.

2. Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

10. Pateman, Carol. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.

John Locke’s political theory, which Pateman considers “historically decisive” in the transition from traditional patriarchy to fraternal patriarchy, directly addresses birth as a criterion for membership in a political society.[10] As Locke writes,

10. Pateman, Carol. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.

6. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. 1689. Ed. Peter Laslett. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

And thus the Consent of Free-men, born under Government, which only makes them Members of it, being given separately in their turns, as each comes to be of Age, and not in a multitude together; People take no notice of it, and thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, conclude they are naturally Subjects as they are Men. But, ‘tis plain, Governments themselves understand it otherwise; they claim no Power over the Son, because of that they had over the Father; nor look on Children as being their Subjects, by their Fathers being so.[6]

Clearly, then, Locke is imagining a citizenship granting process similar to that described above, in which (male) individuals consent to join a political society after coming of age. It is central to Locke’s liberal agenda that people consent to their membership in a political society, but even he is aware of how bizarre it sounds to say that non-immigrant citizens consented to their nationality status. Locke acknowledges that this consenting process is subtle—“People take no notice of it”—but insists that each person consents individually and that real-world governments do not consider children to be their political subjects. However, as Stevens points out, Locke here tells a “fib” because for membership states rely on either birth within a certain territory or birth to a certain bloodline.[12] Locke could have declared birth-based citizenship patently illiberal and proposed consent-based citizenship to replace it, but instead, he claims that birth-based citizenship does not exist in the world. Locke is committed to the fraternal patriarchal agenda of separating political right from sex right and so considers women’s reproductive capacities wholly separate from matters of the polis.

12. Stevens, Jacqueline. Reproducing the State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Launching a defense of Locke and claiming that governments really do “understand it otherwise,” that children born within their territories or possessing a specified pedigree are not members of their states, would require close, nuanced readings of various citizenship statutes to determine whether or not those statutes intend to include children as citizens or not.
Understandably, I hope, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to anticipate the findings of such a detailed study and provide country-specific responses for all—if any—nations that “claim no Power over the Son.” However, if the current American case is at all generalizable, then it is quite clear that children are citizens and that they are citizens from birth. We give to children all manner of citizenship paraphernalia that clearly establish them as citizens—birth certificates, passports, social security numbers. After all, the Fourteenth Amendment states that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States…are citizens of the United States,” and this language certainly does not exclude children.[13] This is all to say that birth and not consent is that which governments recognize to confer citizenship. Rather than acknowledging this fact about the world, Locke leaves birth out of his political theory and further removes women and women’s bodies from his political ontology.

Birth-based citizenship means that women—either women who find themselves in certain places or women with certain blood in their veins—will serve as citizen-producers for the state. In other words, the moment a woman gives birth to a child, the state counts that child among its members, thereby coopting women’s reproductive labor. Birth-based citizenship must be understood as part of modern fraternal patriarchy, specifically as male sex right exercised by the civil fraternity. We can understand John Locke’s peculiar decision to insist that individuals become members of governments by consenting as ultimately patriarchal in form. Because political right is separate from sex right, childbearing is non-political and therefore has nothing to do with governments and their citizens. True to patriarchal form, the state is indebted to and appropriates women’s reproductive capacities but simultaneously deems reproductive labor private and apolitical. Though Locke firmly establishes himself as anti-patriarchal contra the likes of Robert Filmer, his political theory merely repackages traditional patriarchy under the guise of liberalism.

13. U.S. Constitution. Art./Amend. XIV, Sec. 1.

ASSOCIATE AND PERFECT MEMBERSHIP: EXPRESS CONSENT AS EXCLUSIONARY MECHANISM

Part of the work Locke does in the Second Treatise is establishing just how individuals become members of civil society, i.e., become citizens. All men are naturally “free, equal, and independent,” so the only way to form a community and thereby trade those natural freedoms for the protections and comforts of civil society is by “agreeing with other Men to join and unite into a Community.”[6] Locke goes on to call this the “original Compact.”[6] The last section “John Locke, Birth-Based Citizenship, and the Fraternal Social Contract” shows how this original compact grants men access to women’s bodies as citizen-producers. In this section, I demonstrate how the state is able to co-opt women’s reproductive power by making citizenship a function of birth while at the same time excluding women (and nonwhites) from active participation in democracy.

6. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. 1689. Ed. Peter Laslett. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Not everyone “signs” the social contract. A large part of Pateman’s project in The Sexual Contract is to draw attention to the fact that women are excluded from the signing of the social contract. First, individuals in the state of nature are explicitly sexed.[10] In his discussion of “conjugal society,” Locke makes it clear that men and women can marry in the state of nature, and that men should have the last word in marital disagreements because the man is the “abler and the stronger.”[6] Second, Locke employs a head of household model in his discussion of the family. The father of a family exercises “that Executive Power of the Law of Nature,” “which, as a Man, he had a right to.”[6] Lacking both the marital authority given to the husband because of his “abler and stronger” understanding, and the father’s naturally given “executive power,” women have neither the ability nor the right to enter into contracts.

10. Pateman, Carol. The Sexual Contract. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.

The signatories of the social contract are not only exclusively male; they are also exclusively white. In his groundbreaking book, Mills employs a number of mechanisms to uncover the “racial contract,” which remains obscured behind mainstream accounts of “classic” political texts. To focus on Locke’s social contract doctrine, individuals are able to come together and sign the social contract because they are said to exist as free and equal beings in the state of nature. However, only whites possess those necessary traits, while “[nonwhite] subpersons—niggers, injuns, chinks, wogs, greasers, blackfellows, kaffirs, coolies, abos, dinks, googoos, gooks—are biologically destined never to penetrate the normative rights ceiling established for them below white persons.”[9] In other words, nonwhites lack the moral stuff on which the possibility of signing the social contract is based. As a result, these nonwhite subpersons exist as “constitutive outsiders to the political, moral, and epistemological norms that structure the white social world,” which includes Locke’s political theory given in the Second Treatise.[8]

Additionally, the chief reason Locke gives for individuals wanting to leave the state of nature in the first place is the protection of private property. A key requirement for the society that is formed upon leaving the state of nature is that whatever property-based inequality that existed in the state of nature be preserved in the new political community. Mills juxtaposes Lockean property concerns and the deliberate economic exploitation of nonwhites. If civil society preserves whatever property-based inequality existed in the state of nature, then it becomes clear that nonwhites are not at all the beneficiaries of the protections of the social contract. Perhaps most striking for this analysis is Mills’ unpacking of Locke’s statements regarding natural law in the state of nature:

9. Mills, Charles. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.

8. Menzel, Annie. "Birthright Citizenship and the Racial Contract: The United Staes' Jus Soli Rule against the Global Regime of Citizenship." Du Bois Review 10.1 (2013): 29-58.

9. Mills, Charles. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.

Those who show by their actions that they lack or have “renounced” the reason of natural law and are like “wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security,” may licitly be destroyed. But if in the racial polity nonwhites may be regarded as inherently bestial and savage (quite independently of what they happen to be doing at any particular moment), then by extension they can be conceptualized in part as carrying the state of nature around with them, incarnating wildness and wilderness in their person.[9]

Unlike their white European counterparts, nonwhites, because of their “bestial and savage” status, never leave the state of nature. As Mills makes clear, there are a number of devices in Locke’s (and others’) political writing that directly exclude nonwhites from being party to the social contract.

While he does not do so for women and nonwhites, Locke directly addresses the limited autonomy of children: “Children, I confess, are not born in this state of equality, though they are born to it” (304; II, 55). Because they have yet to exit their nonage, children lack the rational capacity the social contract requires of its signatories. However, this fact is not trivial. While the fact of children’s relative freedom and equality as compared to adult, white males is uncontroversial, it remains important to include children among the classes of individuals who do not sign the social contract. Insofar as one of the key tasks of this project is to interrogate Locke’s political ontology, the status of children as political or apolitical entities cannot be ignored.

As has been demonstrated, women, nonwhites, and children cannot be party to the agreement that allows individuals to leave the state of nature and form a body politic. The public sphere, then, consists exclusively of adult, white men.[4, 7] However, the near-universal practice of assigning citizenship at birth means that all individuals, regardless of facts of sex, race, and age, are citizens somewhere.[2] Rather than leaving all people who are not adult, white males behind in the state of nature, the state manages to have these non-consenting individuals among its members. Here we have a tension: only adult, white men meet the moral, rational, and property requirements to sign the social contract, the mechanism whereby someone becomes a member of the body politic, i.e., a citizen. Yet, individuals who do not meet those requirements become citizens anyway because political membership is ascribed at birth.

4. Cavarero, Adriana. "Equality and Sexual Difference: Amnesia in Political Thought." Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity. Ed. Gisela Bock and Susan James. New York: Routledge, 1992. 32-47.

7. McKinnon, Catherine A. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

2. Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

To make sense of this discrepancy, I propose that we divide Lockean political membership into two categories: associate membership and perfect membership. In reference to what I call “perfect membership,” Locke states, “No body doubts but an express Consent, of any Man, entering into any Society, makes him a perfect Member of that Society, a Subject of that Government.”[6] When Locke talks about political membership in the Second Treatise, he is actually talking about perfect membership. Perfect members are members who have the moral, rational, and economic stuff required to sign the social contract. For Locke, perfect members can provide express consent by giving an oath, as immigrants do, or by accepting their parents’ inheritance.[6] I add to this list voting, running for office, and especially military service. Each of these actions demonstrates an agreement to be a subject of a government. However, as stated before, many individuals cannot provide express consent and so never become perfect members. White women, people of color, and children, though they do not sign the social contract, are not left behind in the state of nature. By ascribing political membership at birth—often in the form of jus soli or jus sanguinis—the state is able to “capture” these individuals and make them members as well. I call these individuals “associate members.”

The concept of associate membership requires some unpacking. First, the state of nature is not a physical location. Rather, Locke uses the idea of a state of nature as a heuristic for understanding the liberal tenets he wishes to put forth. All individuals who have not given express consent to join a political society are in a state of nature because they have not given express consent to join a political society.[6] Second, when a child is born, that child is born into a state of nature. Again, children cannot give the necessary express consent to leave the state of nature, so they remain in a state of nature until they provide that consent—if they can. Third, jus soli and jus sanguinis practices make babies into associate members of political societies, but do not remove them from the state of nature and certainly do not make them into perfect members. Perfect membership requires express consent, but the only requirement for associate membership is birth. The concept of associate membership helps to explain the fact that nonwhite, white women, and children are all citizens of political society in spite of the fact that they are not able to give express consent.

6. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. 1689. Ed. Peter Laslett. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Perfect and associate memberships also entail different experiences within political society. Associate membership grants membership in a political community in only the basest bureaucratic sense. (The test for whether or not someone is an associate member of the United States could be whether or not that person possesses an American birth certificate.) On the other hand, perfect membership grants the robust, democratic rights that are supposed to accompany the liberal promise. Those actions which constitute express consent—voting, running for office, serving in the military, and especially owning landed property—are reserved for society’s perfect members. Historically, nonwhites and white women have been barred from such civic activities, so we can understand the civil rights and women’s rights movements as attempts to extend to society’s associate members all of the rights granted to (white, male) perfect members.[7]

7. McKinnon, Catherine A. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

The concept of associate membership requires some unpacking. First, the state of nature is not a physical location. Rather, Locke uses the idea of a state of nature as a heuristic for understanding the liberal tenets he wishes to put forth. All individuals who have not given express consent to join a political society are in a state of nature because they have not given express consent to join a political society.[6] Second, when a child is born, that child is born into a state of nature. Again, children cannot give the necessary express consent to leave the state of nature, so they remain in a state of nature until they provide that consent—if they can. Third, jus soli and jus sanguinis practices make babies into associate members of political societies, but do not remove them from the state of nature and certainly do not make them into perfect members. Perfect membership requires express consent, but the only requirement for associate membership is birth. The concept of associate membership helps to explain the fact that nonwhite, white women, and children are all citizens of political society in spite of the fact that they are not able to give express consent.

6. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. 1689. Ed. Peter Laslett. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

Perfect and associate memberships also entail different experiences within political society. Associate membership grants membership in a political community in only the basest bureaucratic sense. (The test for whether or not someone is an associate member of the United States could be whether or not that person possesses an American birth certificate.) On the other hand, perfect membership grants the robust, democratic rights that are supposed to accompany the liberal promise. Those actions which constitute express consent—voting, running for office, serving in the military, and especially owning landed property—are reserved for society’s perfect members. Historically, nonwhites and white women have been barred from such civic activities,
so we can understand the civil rights and women’s rights movements as attempts to extend to society’s associate members all of the rights granted to (white, male) perfect members.[7]

7. McKinnon, Catherine A. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Though associate members cannot expressly consent, they can tacitly consent. Tacit consent comes in many forms including traveling on a country’s highways and enjoying a country’s temporary lodging.[6] Concerning tacit consent, Hannah Pitkin asks an important question: “to what have you consented when you live in a country and use its highways?” Pitkin answers that one consents to “a kind of associate membership in the commonwealth,” which means that one consents to follow the law.[11] Unlike express consent, which makes one a perfect member of the commonwealth, tacit consent requires one to follow. Tacit consent is useful. Indeed, it is necessary for staving off anarchy. After all, individuals who want to live and work in the United States but not, say, follow the speed limit, could simply never provide express consent for membership in the American commonwealth and therefore never be obliged to obey traffic laws.[8] However, history reveals the darker side of tacit consent as a way of demanding obedience without extending civic participation. The fight for equal rights for black Americans and white women, and even the Revolutionary War slogan of “no taxation without representation,” are all angry responses to the demands of tacit consent when there is no possibility for obtaining perfect membership and the civic trappings thereof.

Locke’s liberal politics require that individuals consent to being members of the commonwealth, but his pragmatic politics require that anarchy be averted. In order to reconcile this tension in his political theory, Locke proposes two types of consent: tacit and express. However, as has been demonstrated, tacit and express consent work just as well to oblige associate members, i.e., citizens by birth, to follow the law while limiting full democratic participation to a select few, i.e., perfect members who have been able to give express consent. Associate and perfect membership are useful for understanding how so-called liberal states can seem to abandon liberal tenets of equality and, in the American case, along specifically racial and gendered lines. However, if we remember that liberalism is but patriarchy in a new guise, then Locke’s seemingly bizarre theoretical moves can be made sensible.

6. Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government. 1689. Ed. Peter Laslett. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

11. Pitkin, Hannah. "Obligation and Consent." The American Political Science Review 59.4 (1965): 990-999.

8. Menzel, Annie. "Birthright Citizenship and the Racial Contract: The United Staes' Jus Soli Rule against the Global Regime of Citizenship." Du Bois Review 10.1 (2013): 29-58.

CONCLUSION

All of the nations of the world, including the “liberal” ones, assign membership based on birth— either birthplace or bloodline—and the aim of this project has been to reconcile this practice with liberalism. More specifically, this project has been about the attempts in the Second Treatise of Government to define the social contract—liberalism’s founding principle—and Locke’s grand “fib” that governments do not, in fact, consider citizenship a function of birth. Pateman’s notion of sex right brings to the fore Locke’s patriarchal agenda, making the Second Treatise tell a story of politics based upon male domination women’s bodies. This thesis is an attempt to show that, while the biological fact of women’s reproductive power makes politics possible, political philosophers are yet more than happy to skim over this essential fact when attempting to derive the foundations of the state. Locke’s Second Treatise is only an example of this sort of “oversight.” Indeed, similar projects could be carried out in other texts in political philosophy, such as in the writings of Hobbes, Marx, and Rawls, to name a few examples.[9]

It is time for a robust theory of the state that centralizes the connection between politics and women’s bodies, and the need for such a theory is growing. Indeed, male sex right and the fraternal patriarchy are alive and well, and the male state retains its vise grip on the female body. Concerns about the so-called “refugee crisis,” fears related to overpopulation and underpopulation, the rising popularity of surrogacy services, attempts to restrict women’s access to birth control and abortions, and the continued criminalization of the reproduction of women of color all need to be understood in terms of male sex right over women’s bodies. Writers such as Pateman, Stevens, and Yuval-Davis provide a foundation such a feminist politics. “Male Sex Right and the Fraternal Social Contract: Political Member in Locke’s Second Treatise of Government” has been an attempt to build on this important work in order to seriously interrogate birth-based politics as a function of mainstream political philosophy’s patriarchalist roots.

9. Mills, Charles. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ken-Terika Zellner